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'''Abstract'''Cities consumed 84% of commercial energy in China, which indicates cities should be the main areas for GHG emissions reduction. Our case study of Shenyang in this paper shows how a clear inventory analysis on GHG emissions at city level can help to identify the major industries and societal sectors for reduction efforts so as to facilitate low-carbon policy-making. The results showed total carbon emission in 2007 was 57 Mt CO2 equivalents (CO2e), of which 41 Mt CO2e was in-boundary emissions and 16 Mt CO2e was out-of-boundary emissions. The energy sector was dominant in the emission inventory, accounting for 93.1% of total emissions. Within energy sector, emissions from energy production industry, manufacturing and construction industry accounted for 88.4% of this sector. Our analysis showed that comparing with geographical boundary, setting system boundary based on single process standard could provide better information to decision makers for carbon emission reduction. After attributing electricity and heating consumption to final users, the resident and commercial sector became the largest emitter, accounting for 28.5% of total emissions. Spatial analysis of emissions showed that industrial districts such as Shenbei and Tiexi had the large potential to reduce their carbon emissions. Implications of results are finally discussed.
 
'''Abstract'''Cities consumed 84% of commercial energy in China, which indicates cities should be the main areas for GHG emissions reduction. Our case study of Shenyang in this paper shows how a clear inventory analysis on GHG emissions at city level can help to identify the major industries and societal sectors for reduction efforts so as to facilitate low-carbon policy-making. The results showed total carbon emission in 2007 was 57 Mt CO2 equivalents (CO2e), of which 41 Mt CO2e was in-boundary emissions and 16 Mt CO2e was out-of-boundary emissions. The energy sector was dominant in the emission inventory, accounting for 93.1% of total emissions. Within energy sector, emissions from energy production industry, manufacturing and construction industry accounted for 88.4% of this sector. Our analysis showed that comparing with geographical boundary, setting system boundary based on single process standard could provide better information to decision makers for carbon emission reduction. After attributing electricity and heating consumption to final users, the resident and commercial sector became the largest emitter, accounting for 28.5% of total emissions. Spatial analysis of emissions showed that industrial districts such as Shenbei and Tiexi had the large potential to reduce their carbon emissions. Implications of results are finally discussed.
 
* '''The ideal scope for accounting GHG emissions should include single process and production chain emissions'''
 
* '''The ideal scope for accounting GHG emissions should include single process and production chain emissions'''
 +
 +
====[http://meetingorganizer.copernicus.org/EGU2010/EGU2010-12930.pdf Anthropogenic greenhouse gas contribution to UK autumn flood risk<ref> P. Pall, T. Aina, D. Stone, P. Stott, T. Nozawa, A. Hilberts, D. Lohmann, and M. Allen, “Anthropogenic greenhouse gas contribution to UK autumn flood risk,” in EGU General Assembly Conference Abstracts, 2010, vol. 12, p. 12930.</ref>]====
  
  

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Contents

GHG Emission Liability

Attribution of Weather and Climate-Related Events[1]

Abstract

Unusual or extreme weather and climate-related events are of great public concern and interest, yet there are often conflicting messages from scientists about whether such events can be linked to climate change. There is clear evidence that climate has changed as a result of human-induced greenhouse gas emissions, and that across the globe some aspects of extremes have changed as a result. But this does not imply that human influence has significantly altered the probability of occurrence or risk of every recently observed weather or climate-related event, or that such events are likely to become significantly more or less frequent in the future. Conversely, it is sometimes stated that it is impossible to attribute any individual weather or climate-related event to a particular cause. Such a statement can be interpreted to mean that human-induced climate change could never be shown to be at least partly responsible for any specific weather event, either the probability of its occurrence or its magnitude. There is clear evidence from recent case studies that individual event attribution is a feasible, if challenging, undertaking.

We propose a way forward, through the development of carefully calibrated physically-based assessments of observed weather and climate-related events, to identify changed risk of such events attributable to particular factors including estimating the contributions of factors to event magnitude. Although such event-specific assessments have so far only been attempted for a relatively small number of specific cases, we describe research under way, coordinated as part of the international Attribution of Climate-related Events (ACE) initiative, to develop the science needed to better respond to the demand for timely, objective, and authoritative explanations of extreme events. The paper considers the necessary components of a prospective event attribution system, reviews some specific case studies made to date (Autumn 2000 UK floods, summer 2003 European heatwave, annual 2008 cool US temperatures, July 2010 Western Russia heatwave) and discusses the challenges involved in developing systems to provide regularly updated and reliable attribution assessments of unusual or extreme weather and climate-related events.


Contributing to local policy making on GHG emission reduction through inventorying and attribution: A case study of Shenyang, China[2]

AbstractCities consumed 84% of commercial energy in China, which indicates cities should be the main areas for GHG emissions reduction. Our case study of Shenyang in this paper shows how a clear inventory analysis on GHG emissions at city level can help to identify the major industries and societal sectors for reduction efforts so as to facilitate low-carbon policy-making. The results showed total carbon emission in 2007 was 57 Mt CO2 equivalents (CO2e), of which 41 Mt CO2e was in-boundary emissions and 16 Mt CO2e was out-of-boundary emissions. The energy sector was dominant in the emission inventory, accounting for 93.1% of total emissions. Within energy sector, emissions from energy production industry, manufacturing and construction industry accounted for 88.4% of this sector. Our analysis showed that comparing with geographical boundary, setting system boundary based on single process standard could provide better information to decision makers for carbon emission reduction. After attributing electricity and heating consumption to final users, the resident and commercial sector became the largest emitter, accounting for 28.5% of total emissions. Spatial analysis of emissions showed that industrial districts such as Shenbei and Tiexi had the large potential to reduce their carbon emissions. Implications of results are finally discussed.

  • The ideal scope for accounting GHG emissions should include single process and production chain emissions

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas contribution to UK autumn flood risk[3]

A three-perspective view of greenhouse gas emission responsibilities in New Zealand[4]

AbstractWhile responsibility for the environmental impacts of production has been commonly assigned to producers, production is driven by consumer demand, and it is valid to question whether impacts should instead be assigned to consumers. However, in each of these approaches producers and consumers either bear the full burden of responsibility or none at all. An example of this is the Kyoto Protocol, where all greenhouse gas emissions areassigned to the producer and no consideration is given to where goods are finally consumed.Rather than taking the conventional producer or consumer responsibility approach, a third perspective is possible in which responsibility is shared. We use input–output analysis to apply all three of these responsibility perspectives to New Zealand's domestic greenhouse gas emissions. Our main findings from the shared responsibility approach are that New Zealand producers are responsible for 44% of domestic emissions, New Zealand consumers take 28%, and 27% are exported. A shared responsibility approach appears to distribute the burden of responsibility and associated liability between parties more fairly,and is likely to be more widely acceptable than pure producer or consumer perspectives.

Research for Deployment: Incorporating Risk, Regulation, and Liability for Carbon Capture and Sequestration[5]

Abstract Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) has the potential to enable deep reductions in global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, however this promise can only be fulfilled with large-scale deployment. For this to happen, CCS must be successfully embedded into a larger legal and regulatory context, and any potential risks must be effectively managed. We developed a list of outstanding research and technical questions driven by the demands of the regulatory and legal systems for the geologic sequestration (GS) component of CCS. We then looked at case studies that bound uncertainty within two of the research themes that emerge. These case studies, on surface leakage from abandoned wells and groundwater quality impacts from metals mobilization, illustrate how research can inform decision makers on issues of policy, regulatory need, and legal considerations. A central challenge is to ensure that the research program supports development of general regulatory and legal frameworks, and also the development of geological, geophysical, geochemical, and modeling methods necessary for effective GS site monitoring and verification (M&V) protocols, as well as mitigation and remediation plans. If large-scale deployment of GS is to occur in a manner that adequately protects human and ecological health and does not discourage private investment, strengthening the scientific underpinnings of regulatory and legal decision-making is crucial.

Climate Change: What Are Local Governments Liable for?[6]

Climate change, insurability of large-scale disasters and the emerging liability challenge[7]

Abstract This paper focuses on the interaction between uncertainty and insurability in the context of some of the risks associated with climate change. It discusses the evolution of insured losses due to weather-related disasters over the past decade, and the key drivers of the sharp increases in both economic and insured catastrophe losses over the past 20 years. In particular we examine the impact of development in hazard-prone areas and of global warming on the potential for catastrophic losses in the future. In this context we discuss the implications for insurance risk capital and the capacity of the insurance industry to handle large-scale events. A key question that needs to be addressed is the factors that determine the insurability of a risk and the extent of coverage offered by the private sector to provide protection against extreme events where there is significant uncertainty surrounding the probability and consequences of a catastrophic loss. We discuss the concepts of insurability by focusing on coverage for natural hazards, such as earthquakes,hurricanes and floods. The paper also focuses on the liability issues associated with global climate change, and possible implications for insurers (including D&O), given the difficulty in identifying potential defendants, tracing harm to their actions and apportioning damages among them. The paper concludes by suggesting ways that insurers can help mitigate future damages from global climate change by providing premium reductions and rate credits to companies investing in risk-reducing measures.

The End-to-End Attribution Problem: From Emissions to Impacts[8]

Abstract When a damaging extreme meteorological event occurs, the question often arises as to whether that event was caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The question is more than academic, since people affected by the event will be interested in recurring damages if they find that someone is at fault. However, since this extreme event could have occurred by chance in an unperturbed climate, we are currently unable to properly respond to this question. A solution lies in recognising the similarity with the cause-effect issue in the epidemiological field. The approach there is to consider the changes in the risk of the event occurring as attributable, as against the occurrence of the event itself. Inherent in this approach is a recognition that knowledge of the change in risk as well as the amplitude of the forcing itself are uncertain. Consequently, the fraction of the risk attributable to the external forcing is a probabilistic quantity. Here we develop and demonstrate this methodology in the context of the climate change problem.

Unilateral regulation of bilateral trade in greenhouse gas emission permits[9]

Abstract This paper considers the coordination of domestic markets for tradable emission permits where countries determine their own emission reduction targets, using a two-country model. Linking such schemes is beneficial to both countries but may cause the exporting country to decrease its emission reduction target and export more permits. This in turn would not only reduce the costs for both countries as less emissions have to be reduced, but it also lowers the environmental benefits of the importing country.

One price instrument (tariff) and two quantity instruments (discount, quota) to prevent the exporting country from issuing more permits are examined. Each instrument restricts trade and alters the terms of trade for the two countries. The importing country (and regulator) prefers an import tariff and an import quota to a carbon discount. If the exporting country releases additional permits, the importing country should not try to keep total emissions constant, as that would be ineffective and maybe even counterproductive. Instead, the importing country should aim to keep the total import constant; this would impose costs on the exporting country that are independent of the policy instrument; an import quota would be the cheapest option for the importing country. An import quota would also stress the idea of supplementary of the flexible mechanism as it increases the share of emissions reduced domestically. Compliance and liability issues constrain the market further. However, both the importing and the exporting country would prefer that the permit seller is liable in case of non-compliance, as sellers' liability would less constrain the market.

The End-to-End Attribution Problem: From Emissions to Impacts[10]

AbstractWhen a damaging extreme meteorological event occurs, the question often arises as to whether that event was caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The question is more than academic, since people affected by the event will be interested in recurring damages if they find that someone is at fault. However, since this extreme event could have occurred by chance in an unperturbed climate, we are currently unable to properly respond to this question. A solution lies in recognising the similarity with the cause-effect issue in the epidemiological field. The approach there is to consider the changes in the risk of the event occurring as attributable, as against the occurrence of the event itself. Inherent in this approach is a recognition that knowledge of the change in risk as well as the amplitude of the forcing itself are uncertain. Consequently, the fraction of the risk attributable to the external forcing is a probabilistic quantity. Here we develop and demonstrate this methodology in the context of the climate change problem.

Estimating the price of tradable permits for greenhouse gas emissions in 2008–12[11]

Abstract Many attempts have been made recently to predict the prices of tradable permits for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008–12). In this paper, we attempt to refine these price estimates based on (i) the results of economic models and identification of factors which influence prices but are not fully reflected in the models, (ii) lessons from price forecasting experience in the US sulfur dioxide market, and (iii) current price data from the nascent international market for GHG permits. We expect GHG permit prices to be at the lower end of the broad spectrum of existing predictions. This implies, among other things, that resource transfers to developing countries associated with emissions trading will be relatively low. Nevertheless, even a modest price will have a significant influence on the decisions of consumers and investors in energy markets around the world.

The blame game[12]

  • More than half the risk of the heatwave occured in 2003 was due to human influence, specially greenhouse gases
  • The critical issue is working out who will pay the cost of adaptation, and compensation for those who cannot adapt

Liability for climate change[13]

  • In order to produce an equitable distribution of liability the concept of averaging over possibilities has been used
  • It is impossible to say that how much the human influence has contributed to an actual weather event
  • We are facing some challenges in tracking down who has emitted what, and where liability lies

The market for tradable GHG permits under the Kyoto Protocol: a survey of model studies[14]

Abstract This paper gathers results from 25 models of the market for tradable greenhouse gas (GHG) emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol. Due to diverging projections of emissions growth and different modeling approaches, the model results differ substantially. The average market volume is approximately 17 and 33 billion USD under global trading and Annex B trading, respectively. Including non-carbon GHG lowers compliance costs and permit prices. In the absence of the US, permit demand roughly equals ‘hot air’ from the former Soviet Union. These countries can increase their revenues from selling permits by restricting supply, which raises the permit price.

Buyer liability and voluntary inspections in international greenhouse gas emissions trading: a laboratory study[15]

AbstractThis paper reports a preliminary laboratoryexperiment in which traders make investments toincrease the reliability of tradableinstruments that represent greenhouse gasemissions allowances. In one half of thesessions these investments are unobservable,while in the other half traders can invitecostless and accurate inspections that makereliability investments public. We implement abuyer liability rule, so that if emissionsreductions are unreliable (i.e., sellersdefault), the buyer of the allowances cannotredeem them to cover emissions. We find thatallowing inspections significantly increasesthe reliability investment rate and overallefficiency. Prices of uninspected allowancesusually trade at a substantial discount due tothe buyer liability rule, which provides astrong market incentive for sellers to investin reliability.

On National and International Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits[16]

Abstract This paper considers the question under what conditions domestic markets of emission permits would and should merge to become an international market. Emission permits are licenses, and so governments would need to recognize other countries’ permits. In a two-county model, we find that it is in both countries’ interests to form an international market, and it may even be beneficial to the environment. Three different policy instruments of the importing country are examined, namely a price instrument (tariff) and two quantity instruments (discount and import quota). All instruments restrict trade. The importing country (and regulator) prefers an import tariff and an import quota to a carbon discount. If the exporting country releases additional permits, the importing country should not try to keep total emissions constant, as that would be ineffective if not counterproductive. Instead, the importing country should aim to keep the total import constant; this would impose costs on the exporting country that are independent of the policy instrument; an import quota would be the cheapest option for the importing country. Compliance and liability issues constrain the market further. However, both the importing and the exporting country would prefer that the permit seller is liable in case of non-compliance, as sellers’ liability would less constrain the market.

Equity, greenhouse gas emissions, and global common resources[17]

Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences[18]

AbstractThe European Commission (document COM (2001) 581) has recently presented a directive proposal to the European Parliament and Council in order to implement a greenhouse gas emission trading scheme. If this proposal survives the policy process, it will create the most ambitious trading system ever implemented. However, the legislative process is an opportunity for various interest groups to amend environmental policies, which as a result generally deviate further from what economic literature proposes. A close look at implemented emission trading schemes, stressing their discrepancies with economic literature requests, is thus useful to increase the chances of forthcoming emission trading schemes to go through the political process. We thus review ten emission trading systems, which are either implemented or at an advanced stage of the policy process. We draw attention to major points to be aware of when designing an emission trading system: sectoral and spatial coverage, permits allocation, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, monitoring, enforcement, compliance, and the harmonisation vs. subsidiarity issue. The aim is to evaluate how far experiences in emission trading move away from theory and why. We then provide some lessons and recommendations on how to implement a greenhouse gas emission trading program in Europe. We identify some pros of the Commission proposal (spatial and sectoral coverage, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, compliance rules), some potential drawbacks (allocation rules, monitoring and enforcement) and items on which further guidance is needed (monitoring and allocation rules). Lastly, the European Commission should devote prominent attention to the US NOX Ozone Transport Commission budget program, as the only example of integration between the federal and state levels.

Does the Market Value Environmental Performance?[19]

Abstract Previous studies that attempt to relate environmental to financial performance have often led to conflicting results due to small samples and subjective environmental performance criteria. We report on a study that relates the market value of firms in the S&P 500 to objective measures of their environmental performance. After controlling for variables traditionally thought to explain firm-level financial performance, we find that bad environmental performance is negatively correlated with the intangible asset value of firms. The average ‘intangible liability’ for firms in our sample is $380 million—approximately 9% of the replacement value of tangible assets. We conclude that legally emitted toxic chemicals have a significant effect on the intangible asset value of publicly traded companies. A 10% reduction in emissions of toxic chemicals results in a $34 million increase in market value. The magnitude of these effects varies across industries, with larger losses accruing to the traditionally polluting industries.

The liability rules under international GHG emissions trading[20]

Abstract Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol authorizes emissions trading, but the rules governing emissions trading have been deferred to subsequent conferences. In designing and implementing an international greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme, assigning liability rules has been considered to be one of the most challenging issues. In general, a seller-beware liability works well in a strong enforcement environment. In the Kyoto Protocol, however, it may not always work. By contrast, a buyer-beware liability could be an effective deterrent to non-compliance, but the costs of imposing it are expected to be very high. To strike a middle ground, we suggest a combination of preventive measures with strong but feasible end-of-period punishments to ensure compliance with the Kyoto emissions commitments. Such measures aim to maximize efficiency gains from emissions trading and at the same time, to minimize over-selling risks.

  • Under a seller-beware regime, any permits acquired by the buyer are valid regardless of whether the seller is in compliance
  • All permits would be worth the same
  • Buyers bears no risks in under the seller-beware liability
  • The seller-beware liability is unlikely to exert sufficient pressure on seller's overselling
  • Trading is allowed to eligible parties whose domestic monitoring, tracking and enforcement systems have met certain "minimum quality" criteria
  • A tradeoff exists between the desirability of assigning the seller responsibility for the validity of acquired permits and the appropriate eligibility threshold
  • To provide incentives for sellers to sell only assigned amounts surplus to their compliance needs could be done with a escrow account
  • Sellers that are perceived to be too risky, may be unable to obtain insurance at a reasonable premium

Prospects for mitigating carbon, conserving biodiversity, and promoting socioeconomic development objectives through the clean development mechanism[21]

Abstract Should forest-based climate mitigationmeasures be approved for crediting through the CleanDevelopment Mechanism (CDM), they could offer anopportunity to accomplish three important objectives:cost-effective reductions in carbon emissions andsequestration of atmospheric carbon; conservation andrestoration of forests and their biological diversity;and, the assistance of host countries and communitiesin their socioeconomic development. However,prospective investors in CDM projects, host countriesand other CDM `stakeholders' might be expected toplace widely different priorities on achieving theseobjectives. This paper describes several factors thatwill affect investor interest in CDM projects, thecharacteristics of forest-based CDM projects that willattract investments, and an approach to identifyingprojects that meet the key objectives of multiplestakeholders. This approach entails identifyingsites, such as degraded watersheds, where CDMfinancing for forest conservation and restoration cangenerate readily monetizable local and regionalsocioeconomic benefits, while mitigating carbonemissions in forests with importance for conservingbiodiversity.

Equity and greenhouse gas responsibility[22]

Causes of twentieth-century temperature change near the Earth's surface[23]

Abstract Observations of the Earth's near-surface temperature show a global-mean temperature increase of approximately 0.6 K since 1900 (ref. 1), occurring from 1910 to 1940 and from 1970 to the present. The temperature change over the past 30–50 years is unlikely to be entirely due to internal climate variability2, 3, 4 and has been attributed to changes in the concentrations of greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols5 due to human activity. Attribution of the warming early in the century has proved more elusive. Here we present a quantification of the possible contributions throughout the century from the four components most likely to be responsible for the large-scale temperature changes, of which two vary naturally (solar irradiance and stratospheric volcanic aerosols) and two have changed decisively due to anthropogenic influence (greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols). The patterns of time/space changes in near-surface temperature due to the separate forcing components are simulated with a coupled atmosphere–ocean general circulation model, and a linear combination of these is fitted to observations. Thus our analysis is insensitive to errors in the simulated amplitude of these responses. We find that solar forcing may have contributed to the temperature changes early in the century, but anthropogenic causes combined with natural variability would also present a possible explanation. For the warming from 1946 to 1996 regardless of any possible amplification of solar or volcanic influence, we exclude purely natural forcing, and attribute it largely to the anthropogenic components.

International greenhouse gas emissions trading: who should be held liable for the non-compliance by sellers?[24]

Abstract Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol authorizes emissions trading, but the rules governing emissions trading have been deferred to subsequent conferences. In designing and implementing an international greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme, assigning liability has been considered to be one of the most challenging issues. This article discusses a variety of the rules for accountability under international GHG emissions trading. It indicates that a ‘buyer beware’ liability is effective only to the extent that it puts additional pressure on sellers to comply with their commitments because after all sellers exercise great, if not complete, control over whether or not they comply with their commitments. Because putting such a pressure on sellers to develop effective compliance systems is not without costs to buyers, a ‘buyer beware’ liability should thus be imposed only in the case where non-compliance of sellers is virtually certain to occur. Moreover, in determining the optimal combination of these not-mutually-exclusive rules for accountability that are discussed in the article, the marginal benefits of adding one rule needs to be weighted against the increased costs of doing so.


Enforcing Compliance: The Allocation of Liability in International GHG Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism[25]

AbstractThe possibility of international trade in credits for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions is a key “flexibility mechanism” built into the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol for international GHG reduction. The Protocol allows ntities in Annex I countries (the industrialized countries agreeing to cap their total emissions) to trade emission reductions. Through the “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM), investors in Annex I countries also can secure GHG reduction credits for emission-reducing activities in non-Annex I developing countries that have not accepted national emission caps. For these forms of international emissions trading to be seen as credible forms of real emissions reductions, legal responsibility, or liability, must be assigned for the failure of promised emission reductions embodied in the credits to materialize. While a well-functioning compliance system is crucial for the integrity of trading, however, excessive restrictions on trading to enforce responsibility could stifle emission credit markets and raise international compliance costs to unacceptable levels. The desirable allocation of liability trades off these two concerns. Liability for the “quality” of an emission reduction credit when created could rest with buyer, seller, or both parties; it also could stay with whoever originally is assigned the liability, or the liability could be transferred as credits are resold. A very high level of compliance by sellers could always be ensured by “gold plating” credits or permits. Before credits can be sold we could require they be certified by an independent agent. Buyers and sellers would then have to decide how often to bring in the certifiers, trading off the costs of more frequent quality control against the advantage of a more continuous flow of certified credits or permits. Since this approach is likely to be quite expensive, either because of certification costs or illiquidity, we focus in this paper on systems that allow trading of emission permits or credits prior to certification with post-trade liability rules that aim to enhance the credibility of trading. Designing good compliance systems would be easy if everybody – traders and governments – had lots of information about the emission-reducing activities of different entities and there were strong legal sanctions within every participating country for nonperformance. In practice, information is scarce and not evenly shared, and both domestic and international enforcement mechanisms are limited in what they can accomplish. Starting with these two points, we first consider some of the general institutional background for international emissions trading. We then consider the assignment of liability in an international GHG trading system for the Annex I developed countries, focusing on the assignment of liability for “bad” emission permits when the seller country is not in compliance with its Kyoto targets known as “assigned amounts.” We turn then to address issues of credibility and liability in the context of CDM joint ventures.

  • Keep records of all your searches.(e.g. Google Scholar for "GHG emission liability").
  • Make a Citation List for all the articles you find relevant to your topic. Arrange in chronological order.
  • Put citation in this format: Van der Geer, J., Hanraads, J.A.J., Lupton, R.A., 2010. The art of writing a scientific article. J. Sci. Commun. 163, 51–59.
  • Hyperlink your citation to the available electronic file or at least the abstract.Ideally link to the DOI and include a link to an open access version if it exists.
  • copy in the abstract
  • include a bullet point list of the main points or useful data in the paper. Do not use complete sentences


to include

References

  1. P. Stott, M. Allen, N. Christidis, R. Dole, M. Hoerling, C. Huntingford, P. Pall, J. Perlwitz, and D. Stone, “Attribution of Weather and Climate-Related Events,” in Climate Science for Serving Society, G. R. Asrar and J. W. Hurrell, Eds. Springer Netherlands, 2013, pp. 307–337.
  2. F. Xi, Y. Geng, X. Chen, Y. Zhang, X. Wang, B. Xue, H. Dong, Z. Liu, W. Ren, T. Fujita, and Q. Zhu, “Contributing to local policy making on GHG emission reduction through inventorying and attribution: A case study of Shenyang, China,” Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 10, pp. 5999–6010, Oct. 2011.
  3. P. Pall, T. Aina, D. Stone, P. Stott, T. Nozawa, A. Hilberts, D. Lohmann, and M. Allen, “Anthropogenic greenhouse gas contribution to UK autumn flood risk,” in EGU General Assembly Conference Abstracts, 2010, vol. 12, p. 12930.
  4. R. Andrew and V. Forgie, “A three-perspective view of greenhouse gas emission responsibilities in New Zealand,” Ecological Economics, vol. 68, no. 1–2, pp. 194–204, Dec. 2008.
  5. E. J. Wilson, S. J. Friedmann, and M. F. Pollak, “Research for Deployment: Incorporating Risk, Regulation, and Liability for Carbon Capture and Sequestration,” Environmental Science & Technology, vol. 41, no. 17, pp. 5945–5952, Sep. 2007.
  6. Ph. England, "Climate Change:What Are Local Governments Liable for?," Griffith University, Mar 2007.
  7. H. C. Kunreuther and E. O. Michel-Kerjan, “Climate change, insurability of large-scale disasters and the emerging liability challenge,” National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
  8. D. Stone and M. Allen, “The End-to-End Attribution Problem: From Emissions to Impacts,” Climatic Change, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 303–318, Aug. 2005.
  9. K. Rehdanz and R. S. J. Tol, “Unilateral regulation of bilateral trade in greenhouse gas emission permits,” Ecological Economics, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 397–416, Sep. 2005.
  10. D. A. Stone and M. R. Allen, “The End-to-End Attribution Problem: From Emissions to Impacts,” Climatic Change, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 303–318, Aug. 2005.
  11. U. Springer and M. Varilek, “Estimating the price of tradable permits for greenhouse gas emissions in 2008–12,” Energy Policy, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 611–621, Mar. 2004.
  12. M. Allen and R. Lord, "The blame game," Nature, vol.432, pp. 551-552, 2004.
  13. M. Allen, “Liability for climate change,” Nature, vol. 421, no. 6926, pp. 891–892, 2003.
  14. U. Springer, “The market for tradable GHG permits under the Kyoto Protocol: a survey of model studies,” Energy Economics, vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 527–551, 2003.
  15. T. N. Cason, “Buyer liability and voluntary inspections in international greenhouse gas emissions trading: a laboratory study,” Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 101–127, 2003.
  16. K. Rehdanz and R. S. Tol, “On National and International Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits,” FEEM Working Papers, 2002.
  17. P. Baer, “Equity, greenhouse gas emissions, and global common resources,” Climate change policy: A survey, pp. 393–408, 2002.
  18. C. Boemare and P. Quirion, “Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences,” Ecological Economics, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 213–230, 2002.
  19. P. H. Bailly, “Does the Market Value Environmental Performance?”
  20. Z. Zhang, “The liability rules under international GHG emissions trading,” Energy Policy, vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 501–508, 2001.
  21. J. J. Hardner, P. C. Frumhoff, and D. C. Goetze, “Prospects for mitigating carbon, conserving biodiversity, and promoting socioeconomic development objectives through the clean development mechanism,” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 61–80, 2000.
  22. P. Baer, J. Harte, B. Haya, A. V. Herzog, J. Holdren, N. E. Hultman, D. M. Kammen, R. B. Norgaard, and L. Raymond, “Equity and greenhouse gas responsibility,” Science, vol. 289, no. 5488, p. 2287, 2000.
  23. S. F. B. Tett, P. A. Stott, M. R. Allen, W. J. Ingram, and J. F. B. Mitchell, “Causes of twentieth-century temperature change near the Earth’s surface,” Nature, vol. 399, no. 6736, pp. 569–572, Jun. 1999.
  24. Z. X. Zhang, “International greenhouse gas emissions trading: who should be held liable for the non-compliance by sellers?,” Ecological Economics, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 323–329, 1999.
  25. S. Kerr, “Enforcing Compliance: The Allocation of Liability in International GHG Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism,” Resources for the Future Climate Issue Brief, vol. 15, 1998.