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===Linking CEO pay to firm performance: empirical evidence from the electric utility industry===
===Linking CEO pay to firm performance: empirical evidence from the electric utility industry===
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03074359910766136 Augustine I. Duru and Raghavan J. Iyengar, “Linking CEO pay to firm performance: empirical evidence from the electric utility industry,” Managerial Finance, vol. 25, no. 9, pp. 21–33, Sep. 1999.] [http://www.appropedia.org/images/0/0b/Linking_CEO_pay_to_performace-_Empirical_evidence_from_the_electric_utility_industry.pdf Open Access]
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03074359910766136 Augustine I. Duru and Raghavan J. Iyengar, “Linking CEO pay to firm performance: empirical evidence from the electric utility industry,” Managerial Finance, vol. 25, no. 9, pp. 21–33, Sep. 1999.]
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===The impact of regulation on CEO labor markets===
===The impact of regulation on CEO labor markets===
D. Palia, “The impact of regulation on CEO labor markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 165, 2000. [http://www.appropedia.org/images/7/7f/The_impact_of_regulation_on_CE.PDF Open Access]
D. Palia, “The impact of regulation on CEO labor markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 165, 2000.
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===CEO Compensation after Deregulation: The Case of Electric Utilities===
===CEO Compensation after Deregulation: The Case of Electric Utilities===
[http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/431440 S. Bryan, L. Hwang, and S. Lilien, “CEO Compensation after Deregulation: The Case of Electric Utilities,” The Journal of Business, vol. 78, no. 5, pp. 1709–1752, 2005.] [http://www.appropedia.org/images/9/92/CEO_Compensation_after_Deregulation_The_Case_of_Electric_Utilities.pdf Open Access]
[http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/431440 S. Bryan, L. Hwang, and S. Lilien, “CEO Compensation after Deregulation: The Case of Electric Utilities,” The Journal of Business, vol. 78, no. 5, pp. 1709–1752, 2005.]
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Revision as of 20:21, 20 January 2016

Note to Readers

Please leave any comments on the Discussion page (see tab above) including additional resources/papers/links etc. Papers can be added to relevant sections if done in chronological order with all citation information and short synopsis or abstract. Thank You.

Background

Searches

  • Google Scholar for CEO Utility Pay
  • Google Scholar for CEO Compensation Electric Utility

Journals

  • Academic OneFile
  • CEO Utility Pay

Utility CEO Pay

From Wikipedia: Electric Utility "The compensation received by the executive in utility companies often receives the most scrutiny in the review of operating expenses. Just as regulated utilities and their governing bodies struggle to maintain a balance between keeping consumer costs reasonable and being profitable enough to attract investors, they must also compete with private companies for talented executives and then be able to retain those executives."

see Executive Compensation in the U.S. for a summary on why private companies seem to have an advantage in terms of CEO pay.

Why CEO Utility Pay?

CEO, or Chief Executive Officer, salary has risen dramatically over the past two decades. Utility companies are found to pay their CEO's significantly less than their private counterparts. This is being investigated to determine the chief reasons CEO's in the electrical utility industry seem to be paid less, and discover if their pay is justified.

How many methods for Calculation?

There are several generally agreed upon components to a CEO's salary:

  • Base Salary
  • Incentive Pay, Short Term (i.e., bonus)
  • Incentive Pay, Long Term (i.e., stocks)
  • Benefits (i.e., Cars, Health Care, Retirement)

Important Issues

key points found across all papers

Literature Review of CEO Utility Pay

Electric Utility Compensation

Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry

P. L. Joskow, N. L. Rose, and C. D. Wolfram, “Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry,” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 165–182, 1996.

Linking CEO pay to firm performance: empirical evidence from the electric utility industry

Augustine I. Duru and Raghavan J. Iyengar, “Linking CEO pay to firm performance: empirical evidence from the electric utility industry,” Managerial Finance, vol. 25, no. 9, pp. 21–33, Sep. 1999.

The impact of regulation on CEO labor markets

D. Palia, “The impact of regulation on CEO labor markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 165, 2000.

CEO Compensation after Deregulation: The Case of Electric Utilities

S. Bryan, L. Hwang, and S. Lilien, “CEO Compensation after Deregulation: The Case of Electric Utilities,” The Journal of Business, vol. 78, no. 5, pp. 1709–1752, 2005.

General Executive Compensation

A comparison of CEO pay-performance sensitivity in privately-held and public firms

H. Gao and K. Li, “A comparison of CEO pay-performance sensitivity in privately-held and public firms,” Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 35, p. 370+, Dec. 2015. Open Access

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