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CEO Utility Pay Literature Review

1,113 bytes added, 02:52, 27 January 2016
Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry
===Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry===
[http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/467373?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents R. R. Geddes, “Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry,” The Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 261–287, 1997.]
*addresses/examines 3 issues::*sensitivity of manager turnover in investor owned utilities to changes in owner and customer wealth:*government owned firms are included in the investigation of turnover & performance vs. manager turnover:*estimates of manager turnover from ''The Journal of Political Economy'' were replicated*Under regulation, if a firm is marking at least the allowed rate of return, the CEO doesn't have to care about owner's interests, and inefficiency has no costs.*Data retrieved from: ''Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the United States'' and ''Statistics of privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States'' over the years 1966-1988*turnover in all firms does not change with shareholder wealth (accounting terms)*turnover in investor-owned was insensitive to changes from the allowed rate of return and real allowed return*Turnover is related to changes in consumer welfare (prices)*Turnover is similar across all firms*turnover in government owned utilities is more sensitive to firm size than investor owned.*Appendix A, Table A1 lists all data sources
===Strategic orientations, incentive plan adoptions, and firm performance: Evidence from electric utility firms===
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